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1. Introduction 
In Risk and Rationality, I argued against what we might call the EU thesis: the claim that individuals are 
rational if and only if they maximize expected utility.  I made a case for two claims.  The first is that there 
are preferences that seem reasonable but cannot be described as cases of expected utility maximization, or 
even re-described as such by individuating outcomes more finely.  The second is that the standard 
arguments for the EU thesis are not in fact strong enough to support that thesis.  I proposed that we 
jettison the EU thesis and adopt the weaker REU thesis: individuals are rational if and only if they 
maximize risk-weighted expected utility.   
 
A key difference between the EU thesis and the REU thesis is that while the former holds that there are 
only two internal attitudes that are combined in preferences—utilities and credences—the latter holds that 
there are three: utilities, credences, and risk-attitudes.1  Roughly, utilities measure how much an 
individual values a particular outcome, credences measure how likely an individual takes a given state to 
be, and risk-attitudes measure how much an individual takes into account what happens in worse states of 
an act as opposed to better states.  For example, individuals who are risk-avoidant REU-maximizers give 
                                                          
1 Throughout, except where it is an explicit topic of discussion, I remain neutral on whether the relevant attitudes 
exist independently of preferences or are constructed from them. 
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more weight to what happens in the worst-case scenario than the best, even when these scenarios are 
equally likely.  This contrasts with EU-maximization, according to which individuals give equal weight to 
scenarios that have equal probability.  Whereas in EU theory, the value contribution of a particular 
outcome to the total value of the act is that outcome’s utility times that outcome’s probability, in REU 
theory, the value contribution of a particular outcome to the total value of the act is that outcome’s utility 
times a factor which depends on both the outcome’s probability and its position in the act’s ordering.2 
 
In their articles, Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs advance new considerations in favor of EU theory.  
Pettigrew advances a novel argument for the EU thesis, namely that an individual whose preferences 
conform to expected utility maximization will be better at estimating the utility values of the acts she is 
choosing among.  He also proposes that those with REU-maximizing preferences can be re-described as 
EU-maximizers.  Specifically, he proposes a way of combining risk-attitudes and utilities so that there are 
ultimately only two fundamental internal states.  Consequently, he concludes that while the EU thesis 
holds, we can agree about which actual preferences are rational, since REU-maximization is merely a 
special case of EU-maximization. 
 
Briggs has two main criticisms of REU theory.  The first is a rejoinder to one of my arguments against the 
EU thesis.  I argued that REU-maximizers are diachronically rational, and Briggs challenges this claim: in 
particular, while I claimed that both sophisticated and resolute choice can vindicate the diachronic choice 
behavior of REU-maximizers, she argues that sophisticated choice cannot in fact vindicate their 
diachronic choice behavior.  Briggs’s other criticism stems from the fact that for REU-maximizers, sub-
acts lack stable utility values.  Because sub-acts lack stable utility values, she claims, REU-maximizers 
lose a valuable tool for simplifying decision problems.  This isn’t an argument for the EU-thesis per se, 
                                                          
2 More precisely, the REU of an act f = {E1, x1; …; En, xn}, where u(x1) ≤ … ≤ u(xn), is 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥1) +
𝑟𝑟(∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖))(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥2) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥1)) +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=2 𝑟𝑟(∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖))(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥3) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥2)) +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=3 … + 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛))(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) − 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1)).  In other 
words, REU(f) = ∑ 𝑟𝑟(∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖))(𝑢𝑢�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� − 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗−1))𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1   This is equivalent to REU(f) = ∑ (𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑟𝑟(∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)) −𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑗𝑗
𝑟𝑟(∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)))𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑗𝑗+1 .  We can see REU as a generalization of Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated utility to subjective 
rather than objective probabilities; or as a restriction of Gilboa’s (1987) (and, recast, Schmeidler’s (1989)) Choquet 
expected utility to weightings that are a function of probabilistic credences; or as a similar generalization of 
objective cumulative prospect theory or restriction of subjective cumulative prospect theory (see Kahnemann and 
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), with the additional stipulation that gains and losses are not 
treated differently.  See (Buchak 2013: Chapters 1 and 2) for a discussion of the relationship of REU theory to other 
non-expected utility theories. 
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but it foregrounds a practical cost of REU theory: REU-maximizers face more difficulties actually making 
ordinary decisions than EU-maximizers do. 
 
Each of these arguments is insightful, original, and challenging.  In this article, I outline responses on 
behalf of REU theory.  In addition to allowing us to continue to deny the EU thesis, these responses will 
illuminate why positing three factors in preference is different from positing two potentially more 
complex factors; how we ought to think about the aim of decision theory; and what are the genuine costs 
of accepting REU theory. 
 
Following Briggs, it will be helpful to anchor the discussion using two individuals: Eulalie, who 
maximizes expected utility, and Rhoda, who maximizes risk-weighted expected utility with r(p) = p2.  My 
claims will be that Rhoda cannot be re-described as an EU-maximizer, that she is both synchronically and 
diachronically rational, and that she is able to simplify her decision problems in natural ways. 
 
2. Pettigrew’s First Challenge: Re-description 
Let us begin with Pettigrew’s argument that Rhoda cannot be re-described as an EU-maximizer.  Re-
description involves making the outcomes (the original bearers of utility) more fine-grained, and then 
assigning values to these fine-grained outcomes, which we can call utility* values.  The upshot will be 
that even though there is no utility assignment to coarse-grained outcomes according to which the 
individual maximizes expected utility, there is a utility* assignment to the fine-grained outcomes 
according to which she maximizes expected utility*.  Thus, Rhoda is an expected utility maximizer, 
merely one with a utility function that ranges over fine-grained outcomes. 
 
The dilemma I presented for re-description of REU-maximizers is this: there is no strategy for fine-
graining outcomes and assigning utility* to fine-grained outcomes that both generates a consistent utility* 
function and survives what I call the proliferation problems (Buchak 2013: Ch. 4).  The proliferation 
problems occur when the EU theorist fine-grains in such a way that too much is up for grabs: for example, 
if outcomes are maximally fine-grained and there are no extra-theoretical constraints on how we assign 
utility* to them, then we can attribute to the agent one of any number of utility functions, and any 
probability function whatsoever.  But the only other alternative, I claimed, is to leave too little up for 
grabs: if outcomes are coarse-grained enough or if there are enough extra-theoretical constraints on 
utility* to avoid the proliferation problems, then we cannot consistently assign expectational utility* 
values at all. 
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One re-description that avoids the proliferation problems but suffers from the inconsistency problem is 
what I called the “comonotonic individuation” (Buchak 2013: 141).  Recall that in EU theory, the value 
contribution of a particular outcome is that outcome’s utility times that outcome’s probability, and in 
REU theory, the value contribution of a particular outcome is that outcome’s utility times a factor which 
depends on both the outcome’s probability and its position in the act’s ordering. The comonotonic 
individuation first re-describes outcomes as <outcome, act> pairs.  Letting “utility” refer to an outcome’s 
utility according to REU theory and “utility*” refer to an <outcome, act> pair’s utility according to EU 
theory, the comonotonic individuation assigns utility* to each pair as follows.  It first sets the utility* 
contribution of the <outcome, act> pair equal to the utility contribution of the outcome to the utility of the 
act, and it then sets the utility* of the pair equal to the utility* contribution divided by the probability of 
the outcome according to the act.   
 
More formally, where events are ordered (1 to n) from worst to best and xi stands for the outcome that 
results from event Ei, the comonotonic individuation sets u*(x, h) = ti u*(xi), where ti is the marginal 
difference in r that p(Ei) makes, divided by p(Ei): 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝑟𝑟�𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∪ …∪ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛)� − 𝑟𝑟�𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+1 ∪ …∪ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛)�
𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∪ …∪ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛) − 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖+1 ∪ …∪ 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖))
𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)                                               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛  
(Pettigrew uses c to stand for the agent’s credence (subjective probability) function, but I use p to match 
my earlier terminology.)  Notice that ti is defined almost identically to Pettigrew’s si: the key difference is 
that ti is defined as the coefficient of the difference that the utility of outcome xi makes, while si is defined 
as the coefficient of the difference that utility ui makes.  These two values are different because there can 
be multiple outcomes with the same utility.  The comonotonic individuation treats outcomes with the 
same utility separately—it takes as a starting point the value contribution that each distinct outcome 
makes—but Pettigrew’s individuation treats them together: it takes as a starting point the value 
contribution that all of the outcomes with a particular utility make together.  We will see that this 
difference is crucial. 
 
So, for example, let us consider the three-outcome act g = {E1, x1; E2, x2; E4, x4}, where the ordered 
utilities and the probabilities are given by:  
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 x1 x2 x4 
u 3 5 6 
 
(We are examining an example that bears some similarity to Pettigrew’s, so we can see clearly what 
problem his individuation solves.)  The REU of this act for Rhoda (who has r(p) = p2) is 4.14.3 
    
According to the comonotonic individuation, Rhoda’s utility* values are:   
u*(x1, g) = 1.7(3) = 5.1 
u*(x2, g) = 1.1(5) = 5.5 
u*(x4, g) = 0.4(6) = 2.4 
Therefore, the “new” EU of the act agrees with the “old” REU: the EU is (0.3)(5.1) + (0.3)(5.5) + 
(0.4)(2.4) = 4.14. 
 
So far, so good.  But this strategy doesn’t work in general, because some acts can be ordered in more than 
one way: when an act contains two events that yield outcomes of the same utility, either event can come 
first in the “ordered” act.  And the comonotonic individuation, applied to these two orderings, won’t yield 
a consistent utility* assignment to the outcomes in those acts.  To see this, let us consider Pettigrew’s 
example, the four-outcome act h = {E1, x1; E2, x2; E3, x3; E4, x4}, whose ordered utilities and probabilities 
are given by: 
 x1 x2 x3 x4 
u 3 5 5 6 
 
Applying the comonotonic individuation to this ordered act, Rhoda’s utility* values are:   
u*(x1, h) = 1.7(3) u*(x2, h) = 1.2(5)  u*(x3, h) = 0.9(5) u*(x4, h) = 0.4(6) 
 
However, the following is an equivalent description of the act, also ordered from worst to best:  
 x1 x3 x2 x4 
u 3 5 5 6 
 
And applying the comonotonic individuation to this (equivalent) ordered act, Rhoda’s utility* values are: 
u*(x1, h) = 1.7(3) u*(x2, h) = 1(5)  u*(x3, h) = 1.3(5) u*(x4, h) = 0.4(6) 
                                                          
3 REU = u(x1) + r(p(E2) + p(E4))(u(x2) – u(x1)) + r(p(E4))(u(x4) – u(x2)) = 3 + (0.3 + 0.4)2(5 - 3) + 0.42(6 - 5) = 4.14. 
 E1 E2 E4 
p 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 
p 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 
 E1 E3 E2 E4 
p 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 
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These two assignments are incompatible.  As we can see, the comonotonic individuation is not well-
defined: it does not yield a consistent assignment of utility* values to outcomes.  That is because, as I 
pointed out (p. 143), “the quantity that is well-defined is the total contribution that all outcomes of a 
particular utility value make to the REU of an act.”   
 
Because an outcome can occupy more than one position in an act’s ordering, I was pessimistic about 
whether any re-description that defined utility* in terms of an outcome’s position in the act’s ordering 
could work.  However, Pettigrew ingeniously uses the quoted fact to define a different kind of re-
description than the ones I considered.  Specifically, he first amalgamates all outcomes with the same 
utility value.  He then looks at how much these outcomes together contribute to the overall value of an 
act.  Next, he assigns this value to these outcomes together as their utility* contribution.  Finally, the 
utility* of the <outcome, act> pair for each of the outcomes will again be their utility* contribution 
divided by their total probability according to the act.  This will give a consistent assignment.  Thus, 
Pettigrew has successfully answered an objection I had to the re-description strategy, namely that there is 
no way of re-describing that will be consistent and avoid the proliferation problem.   
 
Pettigrew’s individuation manages to avoid the proliferation problem while remaining well-defined, 
because it directly incorporates the quantity that is well-defined.  However, Pettigrew’s strategy faces 
another problem. 
 
To see this, let us first look at the utility* assignment we get in Pettigrew’s example. 
 x1 x2 x3 x4 
u 3 5 5 6 
u* 5.1 5.5 5.5 2.4 
 
Notice that the worst outcome and the middle outcomes are all ranked higher than the best outcome, 
according to utility*.  Since u* is supposed to characterize the agent’s preferences, this means that the 
agent prefers <x1, h>, <x2, h>, and <x3, h>, each to <x4, h>.  And this is true even though she’d rather 
have a guaranteed x4 than a guaranteed x1.  
 
Perhaps this is not too devastating a worry, and the relative value of a fine-grained outcome just doesn’t 
reflect which outcome one would prefer to have for certain.  A fine-grained outcome is, after all, a coarse-
grained outcome with a particular probability, in addition to one with a particular position in an act.  
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However, there is a more serious worry: two utility* assignments that represent the same preference 
ordering will not in general order the fine-grained outcomes in the same way.   
 
To see this, first notice that Pettigrew’s Theorem 4 (the re-interpretation of the REU Representation 
Theorem) includes the clause “unique up to affine* transformation.”  A utility* function is unique up to 
affine* transformation if the utility function from which it is defined is unique up to affine transformation.  
Thus, if we apply an affine transformation to u and then calculate u* of the result, u* will represent the 
original preference ordering, in Pettigrew’s sense of “represent.”  With this in mind, here are the u* 
values that result from our original u shifted down by 3 units, and down by 5 units, respectively: 
 
 
 
 
 
All three utility* assignments represent the exact same preference ordering.  However, the u*’s order the 
fine-grained outcomes differently.  This means that for a particular family of u*’s that purport to represent 
the same preferences, even the ordering of outcomes according to u* isn’t preserved.  This is because u* 
is defined as the product of two factors, u and a function of both r and p, and applying an affine 
transformation to just the first factor means that we will not in general replicate the same ordering for 
each u in a family. 
 
The extent to which one thinks that this feature is a serious problem for EU theory will depend on how 
one interprets the utility* function.  Although some decision theorists—realists—hold that utility values 
exist independently of preferences, it is more typical to hold that they are constructed from preferences, 
and thus that cardinal comparisons of utility are meaningless in themselves.  However, we only need to be 
ordinal realists about utility* for the feature under discussion to be a problem.  If there is a fact of the 
matter about how Rhoda ranks fine-grained outcomes, then utility* as Pettigrew defines it cannot track 
this fact.  Furthermore, even constructivists about ordinal preferences will have to admit that Theorem 4 
doesn’t yield a value function that corresponds to any recognizable feature of preferences. 
 
This highlights a more general difference between the REU Representation Theorem and Theorem 4.  On 
the REU Theorem, the role of each of the three internal attitudes is clear (Buchak 2013: Ch. 3).  Even if 
we are not realists about these attitudes, there are three clearly distinct and recognizable features of 
preferences.  Utilities determine, or are determined by, which pairs of outcomes constitute “equal 
 x1 x2 x3 x4 
u 0 2 2 3 
u* 0 2.2 2.2 1.2 
 x1 x2 x3 x4 
u -2 0 0 1 
u* -3.4 0 0 0.4 
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tradeoffs” in acts that order events in the same way.4  Whether one assigns higher probability to one event 
than another determines, or is determined by, whether one would rather bet on that event than the other.  
The risk function determines, or is determined by, how much what happens in an event with a particular 
probability matters to the evaluation of an act, when that event is the best event: how much compensation 
in the rest of the act is required to make up for what happens in that event.  So we have a nice story about 
the role each entity plays in preferences, which fits (at least somewhat) our pre-theoretical intuitions about 
what the role of such an entity would be.  But we don’t really have this on Pettigrew’s story: utility* is a 
muddle of two of these entities.  Forcing two distinct attitudes to count as a single hybrid attitude results 
both in the hybrid attitude not being a readily recognizable contributor to preferences and in our being 
unable to make sense of the values we assign to it.    
 
3. Pettigrew’s Second Challenge: Estimates 
Let us now turn to Pettigrew’s other challenge.  Pettigrew provides a novel argument for the EU thesis: 
for Rhoda (as for any non-EU-maximizer), there will be some EU assignment of values to acts that 
dominates her assignment of values to acts, in the following sense.  In every state, the EU assignment is 
closer to the true value of the act than Rhoda’s assignment is.   
 
We need to be clear about what this argument says, and in particular two things it does not say.  First, it 
does not say that Rhoda will select a dominated act, an act such that there is an alternative act she prefers 
no matter how the world turns out.  The object that is dominated here is an estimate of act values, not an 
act itself.  It is dominated in the sense that there is an alternative assignment that is a better estimate no 
matter how the world turns out.  Second, the argument does not say that any one act’s estimate is 
dominated in all worlds in this sense; rather, the estimate of all the acts, taken as a whole, is dominated in 
the sense that the sum of the errors for each act is higher than it could be in each world.  Let me illustrate 
with a simple example. 
 
Suppose we have two states and three acts, with the following payoffs (in utility): 
 HEADS TAILS 
Bet on Heads 100 0 
Bet on Tails 0 100 
Don’t Bet 50 50 
                                                          
4 More precisely, since the only real facts about utility functions are difference ratios, the utility difference between 
two pairs of outcomes is the same if these two pairs constitute equal tradeoffs in acts with the same structure. 
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Then Eulalie (our EU-maximizer) and Rhoda give the following assignments of act values and truth 
values: 
 Eulalie   Rhoda 
Value of act “Bet on Heads” 50  25 
Value of act “Bet on Tails” 50  25 
Value of act “Don’t Bet” 50  50 
Truth value of “Coin lands HEADS” 0.5  0.5 
Truth value of “Coin lands TAILS” 0.5  0.5 
 
We now ask about the distance of each assignment from the true value of each entity in each state.  
Following Pettigrew, we calculate this distance using the quadratic distance measure: 
 DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH, IN HEADS 
DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH, IN TAILS 
Value of act “Bet on Heads” (50 - 100)2 = 2500 (50 - 0)2 = 2500 
Value of act “Bet on Tails” (50 - 0)2 = 2500 (50 - 100)2 = 2500 
Value of act “Don’t Bet” (50 - 50)2 = 0 (50 - 50)2 = 0 
Truth value of “Coin lands HEADS” (1 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 (0 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 
Truth value of “Coin lands TAILS” (0 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 (1 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 
Distance of Eulalie’s assignments in each state 
 
ACT DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH, IN HEADS 
DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH, IN TAILS 
Value of act “Bet on Heads” (25 - 100)2 = 5625 (25 - 0)2 = 625 
Value of act “Bet on Tails” (25 - 0)2 = 625 (25 - 100)2 = 5625 
Value of act “Don’t Bet” (50 - 50)2 = 0 (50 - 50)2 = 0 
Truth value of “Coin lands HEADS” (1 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 (0 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 
Truth value of “Coin lands TAILS” (0 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 (1 – 0.5)2 = 0.25 
Distance of Rhoda’s assignments in each state 
 
To find out the total distance from truth of the set of estimates at each world, we sum the distance from 
truth of each estimate: 
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 TOTAL DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH IN HEADS 
TOTAL DISTANCE FROM 
TRUTH IN TAILS 
Eulalie’s assignments 2500+2500+0+0.25+0.25 = 
5000.5 
2500+2500+0+0.25+0.25 = 
5000.5 
   
Rhoda’s assignments 5625+625+0+0.25+0.25 = 
6250.5 
625+5625+0+0.25+0.25 = 
6250.5 
 
This illustrates Theorem 1’s conclusion that Rhoda’s assignments are further from the truth in both the 
HEADS state and the TAILS state than Eulalie’s are.  Rhoda’s assignment is dominated in the sense that 
Pettigrew notes.  It is dominated because although Rhoda’s assignment is closer than Eulalie’s by 25 utils 
to the value of “Bet on Heads” in TAILS and “Bet on Tails” in HEADS (true value: 0; Rhoda: 25; 
Eulalie: 50) and further than Eulalie’s by 25 utils from the value of “Bet on Heads” in HEADS and “Bet 
on Tails” in TAILS (true value: 100; Rhoda: 25; Eulalie: 50), the distance measure implies that it is worse 
to be further from the truth, the further you already are.  Being 75 rather than 50 utils from the true value 
is worse than being 50 rather than 25 utils from the true value. 
 
Again, the conclusion is not that Rhoda will select a dominated act: she will select “Don’t Bet,” which is 
not dominated.  It is also not that any particular estimate will be dominated by Eulalie’s estimate in every 
state: while Rhoda’s estimate of “Bet on Heads” does worse in the HEADS state, it does better in the 
TAILS state.  Incidentally, it is also worth noting that although in this particular example, there is a 
dominating assignment that has the same probabilities as Rhoda’s assignment, this won’t always hold.  In 
particular, if all of the acts are comonotonic and if Rhoda and Eulalie agree about the probabilities, then 
Rhoda’s assignment will be closer to the truth in the worst state than Eulalie’s is.  So although there will 
be a dominating assignment (a fact which we know to be true by Theorem 1), it won’t preserve Rhoda’s 
beliefs.  Others have raised and responded to related concerns about dominance arguments (see Easwaran 
and Fitelson (2012) and Pettigrew (2013)), so I will leave it to the reader to decide whether this is a 
problem for the argument. 
 
This consideration aside, should Rhoda care about the kind of dominance she is subject to?  Let us start 
by observing that it is not a kind of dominance that captures what she does care about.  Why?  For her, not 
all error is created equal.  Recall that when Rhoda evaluates a bet on TAILS, the possibility of ending up 
with 0 utils is weighted more heavily than the possibility of ending up with 100 utils.  This is to say, when 
she evaluates an act, she considers being 25 rather than 50 utils away from the true value when that value 
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is 0 to be better than being 50 rather than 75 away from the true value when that value is 100.  Is it not 
just distance from the true value that matters, but how good that value is: roughly speaking, it is more 
important to correctly estimate worse values than better ones.  Rhoda will object to the method Theorem 1 
employs for determining the total distance from the true value in a particular state: she will object to 
simply summing the errors of each estimate.  No score that treats the error in worse states within an act 
the same as the error in better states within that act will capture what she cares about.  Rhoda does not 
care about all errors equally. 
 
We have just established that Rhoda doesn’t care about the kind of dominance mentioned in the 
argument.  Should she?  I claim that she need not.  Decision theory is a theory of instrumental rationality, 
and what we want from decision theory is a ranking of acts (and perhaps an assessment of their relative 
instrumental value) rather than an estimate of the actual value of an act.  The instrumental value of an 
act—its EU or REU—is not an estimate of how valuable that act will in fact turn out to be, but an 
assessment of its value in potentially realizing some of one’s aims, relative to other possible acts.  Being 
close to an act’s actual value (the success condition for an estimate) is only helpful for decision-making 
insofar as the ranking of act-estimates corresponds to which acts turn out to be best at potentially realizing 
some of one’s aims.  But the disagreement is precisely about which acts turn out to be best in this way.  
Therefore, to assume a distance measure that treats all estimation error the same is to prejudge the answer 
to this question.  However, Pettigrew’s argument does reveal a cost of REU theory: if we accept REU 
theory, we cannot see the agent as trying to accurately estimate the values of acts, where accuracy is 
defined without reference to a quantity’s relative position. 
 
4. Briggs’s First Challenge: Choice over Time  
Like Pettigrew, Briggs claims that Rhoda will forgo something that dominates what she actually does—
but where Pettigrew claimed that she would forgo a dominant estimate of act values, Briggs claims that 
she will forgo a dominant strategy, where a strategy is a series of acts over time. 
 
To understand Briggs’s argument, we must recall the three methods of choice over time: naïve choice, 
sophisticated choice, and resolute choice.  Choosing naively means choosing at each time the act that is 
part of your preferred strategy going forward, with no regard to what your past or future selves do or 
prefer.  Choosing sophisticatedly means choosing at each time as if your future act is determined by your 
future selves’ preferences, using backward induction to eliminate options that you know your future self 
12 
 
will not choose.5  Choosing resolutely means picking a strategy and sticking to it—the strategy could be 
determined by your earliest preferences, or it could represent some compromise between the preferences 
of all your time-slices.6   
 
Keeping these methods in mind, let us examine the dialectic.  Briggs interprets me as having challenged 
both premises in the following argument: 
(1) According to REU theory, it is sometimes permissible for an agent to choose a strategy in an 
extended choice situation, where that strategy is dominated by some option available to the agent. 
(2) Choosing a strategy that is dominated by some available option in an extended choice 
situation is irrational. 
I’ve altered her statement of the first premise to make clear that the dominance must be by some strategy 
that is available to the agent.  For example, buying baseball tickets with a dollar-off coupon dominates 
buying them without the coupon—it is preferable whether I sit in the cheap seats or the expensive seats—
but if the option of using the coupon is not available to me, then I do nothing wrong by paying full price.  
(I will later consider a slightly different interpretation of Briggs’s argument, one that recasts the first 
premise in a different way.)   
 
I challenged the first premise, Briggs points out, by claiming that only naïve choosers pick strategies that 
are dominated by other strategies available to them, and that both resolute and sophisticated choosers do 
not do so: resolute choosers because although all of the relevant options are available to them, they do not 
select a dominated one; and sophisticated choosers because the only options that dominate their selected 
option are not available to them.  Briggs objects to my challenge by arguing that the strategy that 
dominates the sophisticated chooser’s selection is in fact available to her.  She leaves unchallenged the 
claim that resolute choosers do not pick dominated options.  So, according to Briggs, only proponents of 
resolute choice can deny the first premise—proponents of sophisticated choice must accept it. 
 
According to Briggs, I also challenged the second premise by claiming that choosing a dominated strategy 
in an extended choice situation can be rational, on the grounds that we can explain and vindicate why an 
agent would make these choices.  And her response is to argue that choosing a dominant strategy 
constitutes irrationality.  I prefer to put things slightly differently.  I agree with premise (2) that choosing 
a strategy dominated by an available option in an extended choice situation is irrational; therefore, I agree 
                                                          
5 See Strotz (1955), Hammond (1988), and McClennen (1990). 
6 See Strotz (1955), McClennen (1990), McClennen (1997), and Gauthier (1997).  
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with Briggs that naïve Rhoda is irrational, and that if sophisticated Rhoda really does choose an option 
dominated by an available option, then sophisticated Rhoda is also irrational.  However, I think that 
having preferences of a certain form—preferences that necessitate sophisticated or resolute choice—is 
rational.  That was the intended force of my arguments that Briggs mentions in her section 3.  (These 
preferences would lead one to choose a dominated strategy if one chose naively, so the misinterpretation 
is understandable.)  Still, we can recast Briggs’s argument against choosing dominated options as instead 
against having these preferences: she can argue that having preferences that necessitate sophisticated or 
resolute choice constitutes practical irrationality.  
 
Let us begin with the question of whether sophisticated Rhoda indeed chooses a strategy that is 
dominated by a strategy available to her: Briggs claims she does, I claim she does not.  Our locus of 
disagreement is the choice problem that Briggs labels Problem 2, in which Rhoda faces a choice between 
two acts, L1 and L2 (from Allais (1953/1979)).  Rhoda prefers L1 to L2. But before making her choice, she 
first must choose whether to accept more information about the true state of the world along with a 
sweetener—a sweetener which is not sweet enough that make sweetened L2 preferable to unsweetened L1.  
The information will reveal which of two events obtains, and for both events, Rhoda will prefer the sub-
act of sweetened L2 under that event to that of unsweetened L1 under that event.  Since Rhoda is a 
sophisticated chooser, she knows she will choose according to her preferences after obtaining the 
information, and will therefore end up with an act logically equivalent to sweetened L2 if she does receive 
the information.  As a sophisticated chooser, she therefore sees her initial choice as between receiving the 
information and ending up with sweetened L2, or forgoing the information and ending up with L1.  Since 
she prefers L1, she will forgo the information.  However, there was a series of choices she could have 
made—namely, accepting the information and the sweetener, and choosing (the logical equivalent of) 
L1—which would have resulted in sweetened L1.  Since sweetened L1 strictly dominates what she ends up 
with (unsweetened L1), she chooses a dominated option. 
 
What I said in Risk and Rationality is that sweetened L1 is not available to sophisticated Rhoda.  
Sophisticated choice only makes sense if we operate with a restricted notion of an agent’s options: an 
agent’s options are her options at a particular time.  And there is no time at which the acts that constitute 
choosing sweetened L1 are available to Rhoda.  However, Briggs challenges this point (note that “L1+” 
stands for sweetened L1): 
Nonetheless, there is a sequence of actions, each of which Rhoda can perform, that will guarantee 
she ends up with L1+.  (All she has to do is choose sweet knowledge at [1], and choose L1+ at 
[2A], should she get there.)  In other words, there is a strategy available to Rhoda that results in 
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her ending up with L1+.  Buchak holds that on the view that motivates sophisticated choice, we 
are not entitled to evaluate entire strategies, since there is no time at which strategies are the 
object of choice.  But the objector should press the point that a strategy can be available, even if 
there is no one time at which it is available.  (p. [8], italics mine) 
The argument says, look, Rhoda can have sweetened L1—it’s available to her!  All she has to do is select, 
at each time, the acts that constitute it.  There is a difference between saying that an option is available to 
Rhoda and saying that there is a single time at which it is available to her, and sweetened L1 is available 
to Rhoda in this former sense. 
 
I want to press my point that the reasons you might have for accepting sophisticated choice are also 
reasons to think that availability is just availability at a time.  Recall that there are two views one might 
have of what an agent is.  One is the time-slice view, which sees a rational agent as a series of time-slices 
that each forms preferences and makes decisions in isolation of what other time-slices prefer.  On this 
view, one’s choices are fully determined by what each of one’s time-slices prefers, and furthermore, one 
stands in a similar relationship to one’s other time-slices as one does to other people.  I can influence 
others’ actions indirectly—by incentivizing them in various ways (changing their payoffs) or by limiting 
what they can do (changing their options) or by convincing them to care about what I care about 
(indirectly changing their preferences)—but I cannot choose for them.  So too can I influence the actions 
of my future self only indirectly: I can set up rewards and penalties, I can remove future options, I can 
cultivate a desire to honor past wishes, but I cannot now choose what to do later in a way that will bind 
me to that choice.  An individual at a time has influence over the actions of her time-slices taken together 
to the same extent and in the same way (though perhaps by a different mechanism) that an individual has 
influence over the actions of a group of which she is a part.  Carrying out a strategy is the result of several 
“selves” trying to get what they most prefer, given the behavior they can expect from the other selves.  As 
I put it in Risk and Rationality, there is no agent to whom temporally extended acts are available: there is 
only a temporal extension of time-slices to whom acts-at-a-time are available.7 
 
The time-slice view provides a natural home for sophisticated choice: sophisticated choice enjoins me to 
see my future selves’ choices as fixed, and to treat them as I would treat the choices of other individuals.  
Sophisticated choice looks less natural on a holistic view of agency.  On this view, the primary locus of 
action is the temporally extended agent.  And the primary entities over which such an agent has control 
                                                          
7 This coheres with a view recently put forth by Hedden (2015), a proponent of the time-slice picture, of what an 
option is: “your options are all and only the decisions you are presently able to make”(95). 
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are temporally extended acts.  Given these assumptions, sophisticated choice is a puzzling strategy.  Why 
should I treat my future actions as determined, while deliberating about my present actions?  I should 
instead deliberate about strategies over time, and choose once for all.  This is why resolute choice finds a 
natural home in this picture. 
 
I won’t adjudicate the debate between the time-slice view of agency, with sophisticated choice, and the 
holistic view of agency, with resolute choice.  What I continue to claim is that we don’t have a reason to 
accept both sophisticated choice and the claim that the dominating option is available.  The proponent of 
EU theory will have to supply a picture on which this combination of commitments makes sense.  Indeed, 
what Briggs highlights is that if we accept sophisticated choice, then the debate between REU theory and 
EU theory hinges on what counts as an option. 
 
Before moving on to a different version of Briggs’s argument, let us briefly return to her second point.  
Recall that she reads me as denying that choosing dominated strategies is irrational, on the grounds that 
we can explain and vindicate these choices.  Her point as stated is that choosing dominated strategies is 
constitutive of irrationality, because doing so is both “internally” irrational—it amounts to choosing 
something that is worse by Rhoda’s own lights—and “externally” irrational—it frustrates the aim of 
choosing the act with the best consequences.  I agree with this point, and this is a good way of putting 
what’s wrong with choosing dominated strategies.  However, recall that what I actually deny is that 
having preferences that in some situations require sophisticated or resolute choice is irrational.  So, let us 
look at an amended version of Briggs’s argument for the claim that having these preferences is 
constitutive of irrationality.  This argument would say that having such preferences is irrational because 
having them amounts to preferring something that is worse by Rhoda’s own lights (internally irrational), 
or that having such preferences is irrational because having them frustrates the aim of preferring the act 
with the best consequences.  But these claims only hold if preferences over strategies are determined both 
by the consequences of those strategies and by what one would do if one were naïve—and there is no 
reason to think this second clause holds.  Therefore, the amended version of the argument has not yet 
revealed that Rhoda is irrational. 
 
We can further explore the question of whether anything is wrong with sophisticated Rhoda by 
considering the interpersonal analogue of Problem 2.  Assume that choices are made by two different 
agents with different knowledge states, rather than by two time-slices of the same agent before and after 
receiving information.  These agents, Rhoda1 (who doesn’t know whether E) and Rhoda2 (who does know 
whether E), have Rhoda’s preferences about outcomes and lotteries.  Rhoda1 will choose Sweet 
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Knowledge or Ignorance at the initial decision node, and if she chooses Ignorance she will also choose at 
2C; and Rhoda2 will choose at 2A (we will ignore the choice at 2B, as Briggs does, because both Rhoda’s 
are indifferent between the two options at that node).  We can represent this choice using a game matrix, 
where Rhoda1 is the “row” player, Rhoda2 is the “column” player, and the payoffs to each player are the 
lotteries that they will receive.  
 
 2A: L1+ 2A: L2+ 
Sweet Knowledge L1+, (L1+E or L1+(⌐E)) L2+, (L2+E or L2+(⌐E)) 
Ignorance 
2C: L1 
L1, (L1E or L1(⌐E)) L1, (L1E or L1(⌐E)) 
Ignorance 
2C: L2 
L2, (L2E or L2(⌐E)) L2, (L2E or L2(⌐E)) 
 
The two highlighted acts constitute the sub-game perfect equilibrium, the result of backward induction: 
Rhoda2 will choose L2+ at 2A; so the payoff of Sweet Knowledge for Rhoda1 will be L2+; so Rhoda1 
chooses Ignorance and L1.   
 
What of the original claim that Rhoda employs a strategy that is diachronically dominated?  Translating 
into the interpersonal framework, it is the claim that Rhoda1 and Rhoda2 choose an act pair that is strictly 
sub-optimal: there is an alternative act pair whose outcome is strictly preferred by both Rhoda1 and 
Rhoda2 to the selected outcome: namely, (Sweet Knowledge, L1+).8  Thus, the notion of diachronic 
dominance in the intrapersonal framework translates into the notion of sub-optimality in the intrapersonal 
framework; and the strategy selected by sophisticated choice translates into the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium.  The interpersonal framework also has a concept of dominance: an individual player’s act is 
dominated if there is some alternative act which leads to a preferred outcome given any choice made by 
the other player.  Dominance in this sense is a property of an individual’s act, not of an act pair.  
Translation in hand, we can restate my claim that the (intrapersonal) strategy that selects L1 is not 
dominated by any other available option: for the acts chosen by each Rhoda-at-a-time, there is no 
alternative act that is preferable no matter what the other Rhoda’s-at-a-time choose. 
                                                          
8 The usual game-theoretic terminology is “strategy” for an individual’s choice and “strategy pair” for the pair of 
strategies chosen by the two agents.  However, since I follow Briggs in using “strategy” to refer to the pair of acts 
chosen by the agent at the earlier time and at the later time, the interpersonal analogue of which is the pair of acts 
chosen by the two agents, I will instead use “act” and “act pair.”   
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If we take seriously the correspondence between the intrapersonal problem and the interpersonal 
problem—as it seems the time-slice view must—then what is bad about Rhoda’s strategy is the bad of an 
act pair’s being sub-optimal.  Given this, we can construct the following version of Briggs’s argument:9 
(1’) According to REU theory, it is permissible for the sophisticated chooser to choose a strategy 
(a pair of acts-over-time) in an extended choice situation, where that strategy is intrapersonally 
sub-optimal.  
(2’) Choosing a strategy that intrapersonally sub-optimal is irrational for the sophisticated 
chooser. 
This argument correctly isolates what is available to an agent on the time-slice picture, so premise (1’) is 
true.  But is premise (2’) true?  We must consider what norms an agent is subject to, on the time-slice 
picture. 
 
Let us examine the corresponding interpersonal question: is it irrational for two players to select a sub-
optimal act pair?  The standard view is that choosing a sub-optimal act pair is not irrational because there 
is no one for whom it is irrational.  Being in a problem in which the equilibria are sub-optimal is 
unfortunate, but the result is not a failure of rationality on the part of any actors, since both are doing the 
best they can given what the other chooses.  Analogously, if rational norms concern the agent at a time,10 
then choosing a sub-optimal act pair is not irrational because there is no one time-slice for whom it is 
irrational.  It is unfortunate that the agent over time suffers, but each time-slice is acting rationally, and 
one is only answerable for what one does at a time. 
   
There is a minority view according to which selecting a sub-optimal strategy pair in the interpersonal 
situation is in fact irrational.  However, those who accept this view typically accept the analogue of 
resolute choice for groups, that separate individuals can jointly decide on an act pair and each do their 
                                                          
9 I think this isn’t quite the right way to interpret Briggs herself, because the argument of mine that Briggs cites 
against premise (1) would actually concern premise (2’).  Nonetheless, this argument is at least strongly suggested 
by her discussion. 
10 A recent proponent of this view is Hedden (2015), who argues for “time-slice rationality,” according to which 
“how you rationally ought to be at a time directly depends only on your mental states at that time, not on how you 
(or time-slices psychologically continuous with you) were in the past or will be in the future”(7).  Moss (2015) 
argues for a similar view in epistemology, which she dubs “time-slice epistemology.” 
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part.11  Thus, on this view, selecting a sub-optimal strategy pair is irrational because both players are 
acting irrationally.  Analogously, a proponent of the time-slice picture could hold that both time-slices 
ought to choose resolutely—resolute Rhoda would be irrational to pick a sub-optimal act pair, but she 
won’t do so.  If we accept the time-slice picture, then either the time-slices ought to choose resolutely, in 
which case Rhoda won’t end up with the sub-optimal strategy, or they ought not to, in which case Rhoda 
won’t be violating any norms in ending up with the sub-optimal strategy. 
 
What Briggs and I agree on is that decision theorists face a choice.  If a theorist wants to accept 
sophisticated choice and the idea that diachronic dominance is irrational, she must reject REU theory.  I 
do not think this is worrisome for REU theory, because sophisticated choice and this idea do not fit 
together well.  In any case, the REU theorist still has many theoretical options open to her: she can be a 
proponent of sophisticated choice and hold that diachronic dominance is not bad.  Or she can be a 
proponent of resolute choice, holding that Rhoda will not be subject to diachronic dominance.  Insofar as 
one is convinced that the intrapersonal problem is not like the interpersonal problem—that there is a unity 
among time-slices that does not hold among people—this latter option may be the best. 
 
5. Briggs’s Second Challenge: Simplifying Choices 
Briggs’s other criticism of REU theory is that for Rhoda, sub-acts lack stable utility values: the 
contribution of a particular sub-act to an act’s value can depend on what happens in the rest of the act.  
Put another way, the certainty equivalent of each sub-act—the sure-thing amount we can substitute for 
that sub-act while preserving the value of the act—can depend on what happens in the rest of the act.  
This follows from the fact that preferences about “sure-thing” sub-acts are fixed—if an agent prefers a 
sure-thing x to a sure-thing y, she will always rather include x as a sub-act than include y as a sub-act—
but preferences about “gamble” sub-acts depend on which other sub-acts they are paired with.  Since 
there is a stable ordering of sure-thing sub-acts, but not of gamble sub-acts, certainty equivalents for 
gamble sub-acts cannot stay fixed.   
 
                                                          
11 See, for example, McClennen (1997), who explicitly makes the connection between intrapersonal decisions and 
the interpersonal decisions, and argues that resolute choice can resolve problems within both.  Gauthier (1997) 
denies that the two types of decisions are analogous: other people’s concerns always ought to be taken seriously but 
my past concerns can cease to matter when I no longer embrace them.  Furthermore, he holds that sophisticated 
choice rather than resolute choice ought to be employed in typical intrapersonal situations; however, when 
sophisticated choice would be sub-optimal, resolute choice ought to be employed.  Thus, insofar as he holds that 
landing on a sub-optimal strategy pair is irrational, he holds that resolute choice is appropriate. 
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Is the fact that sub-acts lack stable values bad?  One possible way to argue in the affirmative, though 
Briggs herself does not make this argument, is to claim that not being able to assign stable values to sub-
acts is in itself bad.  One could claim that the individual who does not stably value sub-acts has 
inconsistent values.  But the REU response is to point out that since the instrumental value of an act 
depends on its global properties, the contribution of any sub-act will depend on which global properties it 
helps instantiate, which depends on which sub-acts it is paired with.  In short: REU theory holds that 
while there is a fixed fact of the matter about the value of an outcome, and about the instrumental value of 
an entire act, there is no fixed fact of the matter about the instrumental value of a sub-act, apart from the 
act in which it is embedded.  As I said in Risk and Rationality, what instrumental value is like generally—
including whether sub-acts with the same instrumental value are interchangeable—is not a pre-theoretical 
question.  So this argument would straightforwardly beg the question against REU-maximization. 
 
The argument Briggs actually makes is that because sub-acts lack fixed values, REU-maximizers lose a 
key strategy for simplifying ‘grand world’ decisions by recasting them as ‘small world’ decisions.  This 
isn’t necessarily to say that Rhoda is irrational, but she will have a more difficult time actually making 
decisions.  REU theory is unwieldy and impractical.   
 
Briggs’s example involves a decision between buying a frogurt and not buying a frogurt, where one does 
not know whether the frogurt is cursed, whether it comes with a free topping, and if so whether the 
topping contains E212.  The decision matrix is as follows: 
  
 Cursed 
Topping 
E212 
Cursed 
Topping 
No E212 
Cursed 
No topping 
Not cursed 
Topping 
E212 
Not cursed 
Topping 
No E212 
Not cursed 
No topping 
Buy -50 -30 -45 10 30 15 
don’t buy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Briggs points out that Eulalie can easily simplify the problem by “collapsing” the values under “cursed” 
and “not cursed” into the expected values in those events.  However, claims Briggs, while Rhoda can 
impute values to these events, the value of the event in which the frogurt is cursed “will not be a function 
of the probabilities and utilities of states in which the frogurt is cursed,” but instead “will also depend on 
both the probabilities and utilities of the states in which the frogurt is not cursed”([13]); and similarly for 
the value of the event in which the frogurt is not cursed.  More generally, while Eulalie will be able to 
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coarse-grain her problem by collapsing some states into a single event with a fixed utility value, Rhoda 
cannot coarse-grain her decision problems in this way.   
 
As it turns out, only a weakened version of Briggs’s claim is true.  To see this, let us first consider an 
abstract example in which there are four states.  Let u(S) stand for the utility of ACT in state S, and let 
u(A) ≤ u(B) ≤ u(C) ≤ u(D): 
  
 A B C D 
ACT u(A) u(B) u(C)  u(D) 
 
The risk-weighted expected utility of ACT is: 
 REU(ACT) = u(A) + r(p(BvCvD))(u(B) – u(A)) + r(p(CvD))(u(C) – u(B)) + r(p(D))(u(D) – u(C)) 
Which can be rewritten as: 
 REU(ACT) = u(A)(1 – r(p(⌐A))) + u(B)(r(p(A)) – r(p(⌐(AvB))  
+ u(C)(r(p(CvD)) – r(p(D))) + u(D)(r(p(D)) 
Notice that the terms on the first line are a function only of the probabilities and utilities of states A and 
B, and the terms on the second line are a function only of the probabilities and utilities of the states C and 
D.  So we can, indeed, divide the REU of ACT into two parts, an “A or B” part and a “C or D” part.  But 
notice that we cannot divide the REU of ACT into an “A or C” part and a “B or D” part: we cannot 
separate terms that involve only probabilities and utilities of A and C from those that involve only 
probabilities and utilities of B and D.   
 
We can separate ACT in one way and not the other because the successful separation involves a division 
into events that are contiguous.  Define a contiguous event (set of states) for a given act as follows: E is 
contiguous iff E contains all states S such that minT∈E u(T) < u(S) < maxT∈E u(T).  And we can note that if 
the states of an act are divided into two contiguous events, then the value contribution of each event to the 
act will depend only on the probabilities and utilities of the states in the event.12  For the sub-act over each 
                                                          
12 Notice that if there are two states with the same utility, then a contiguous event with this utility as the minimum or 
maximum value can include one state, the other state, or both.  This won’t pose the same kind of problem as it does 
for the comonotonic individuation (discussed in section 2), since we are not trying to come up with a utility 
contribution for an event independent of the ordering under consideration (i.e., independent of the particular coarse-
graining we consider). 
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contiguous event, its value will be stable and will depend only on the probabilities and utilities of the 
states within that event. 
 
It is worth noting two caveats in support of Briggs’s objection, as well as an additional fact in support of 
Rhoda’s ability to simplify decisions.  First, even with a contiguous division, there will be no natural way 
to divide the value of each event into a “probability” and “utility” component, as there is for EU theory.  
Second, the claim that the value of each event only depends on the probabilities of the states in that event 
only holds true for a coarse-graining into more than two events if the probabilities of all the coarse events 
are fixed.  However, in support of REU theory, the sub-acts of any contiguous division (including those 
into more than two events) do have stable certainty equivalents.  We know this because preferences about 
sub-acts are stable for acts that are comonotonic, and substituting a certainty equivalent for a sub-act on a 
contiguous event preserves comonotonicity, because a certainty equivalent will always be between the 
minimum and maximum value of a sub-act. 
 
To return to the frogurt problem: in this problem, all of the cursed states have lower utility than all of the 
non-cursed states.  If we coarse-grain the problem into the event in which the frogurt is cursed and that in 
which the frogurt is not cursed, we can separately determine the value of the act in the “cursed” states and 
in the “non-cursed” states—where “value” here means the value contributed to the REU by these states—
and these two values will depend only on the probabilities and utilities within those states.  This also 
means that the value of act in the cursed states will be stable across changes to probabilities and utilities 
within the non-cursed states.  For example, here are some possible changes: the value of a not-cursed 
frogurt with no topping might change; or the agent might come to realize that this value depends on a 
further unknown (whether it is possible to swirl two flavors or whether one has to choose only one); or 
the probability that a non-cursed frogurt comes with a topping might change, holding fixed the probability 
that the frogurt is cursed.  As long as these changes do not disrupt the contiguity of the division into 
cursed and non-cursed states or the probability of the two events, then these changes will only alter the 
value of the non-cursed event—the value of the cursed event will stay the same.  So we can simplify the 
decision problem by separately considering how good the cursed event it and how good the non-cursed 
event is. 
 
However, if we coarse-grain the problem into the event in which the frogurt comes with a free topping 
and the event in which is does not, we cannot separately consider how good each event is.  So we cannot 
simplify the decision problem by separately considering how good the free-topping event is and how 
good the no-free-topping event is. 
22 
 
 
To sum up: for some coarse-grainings of the problem—coarse-grainings into contiguous sets—Rhoda can 
assign stable values to coarse-grained events, and these values will depend only on what happens within 
those events.  For other coarse-grainings, this will not be possible.  Coarse-graining will be an effective 
way of simplifying a decision problem only if it represents a division into two contiguous events (or into 
two or more contiguous events where the value of a coarse-grained event is allowed to depend on the 
probability of the other coarse-grained events).  But this may not be very bad for REU theory.  Indeed, it 
explains why some ways of thinking about a decision problem strike us as productive and others as 
unproductive.  In the frogurt problem, the consideration that ought to loom largest in our minds is whether 
or not the frogurt is cursed, not whether or not the frogurt comes with a free topping.  It is true that Rhoda 
has a more difficult time simplifying her decision problems than Eulalie does: only certain simplifications 
will do.  But perhaps this just means that Rhoda is appropriately discriminating in how she thinks about 
decision problems. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Pettigrew and Briggs both raise important challenges for REU theory.  Pettigrew’s first challenge tried to 
show that REU theory is superfluous, since Rhoda can in fact be recast as an EU-maximizer.  However, 
his way of incorporating her risk-attitudes into the utility value assignment did not generate a stable 
ordering of outcomes.  Pettigrew’s second challenge tried to show that Rhoda’s utility and probability 
assignments are dominated in the sense that there is an alternative set of assignments that are closer to the 
truth in every world.  However, there are reasons to think that she will reject the measure of closeness 
according to which this is true.  Furthermore, one could hold that what decision theory is concerned with 
is not estimating truth values, but with comparing acts—on this view, dominance according to this 
measure need not be irrational.  Briggs’s first challenge concerned a different kind of dominance: 
diachronic dominance.  However, depending on our picture of agency and norms, we must either accept 
that Rhoda chooses her best available option or that failing to do so is not irrational.  Still, Briggs brings 
out a cost of accepting REU theory: one cannot also accept both sophisticated choice and the claim that 
norms of rationality apply to the agent over time.  Finally, Briggs’s second challenge pointed out that 
Rhoda lacks a way to simplify her decisions, a way that Eulalie possesses.  Importantly, this claim is only 
true in a limited sense: Rhoda can simplify her decisions in some ways but not others, and this distinction 
plausibly tracks ways of simplifying decisions that seem natural to us. 
 
These challenges help us see more clearly what REU theory is committed to, as well as some of the costs 
of rejecting the EU thesis.  For my part, I continue to hold that it is rational to take risk into account in a 
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way that cannot be subsumed under EU-maximization, and that rational preferences involve three internal 
attitudes: utilities, credences, and risk-attitudes. 
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